PHIL 3621

PHIL 3621

Course information provided by the 2016-2017 Catalog.

Consciousness, Free Will, and Physicalism:    Do facts about consciousness and free will conflict with the hypothesis that we are completely physical beings?  In this course we will first assess the two most influential arguments for the impossibility of a physical account of the consciousness: the knowledge and conceivability arguments. We will then use these assessments to evaluate a number of possible positions in the ontology of mind. Is the best physicalism eliminativist, reductionist, or anti-reductionist?  Is the best anti-physicalism substance dualist, property dualist, idealist, Russellian monist, or panpsychist?  Lastly, we will consider the consequences that physicalism has for the claim that we have free will.


Distribution Category (KCM-AS)

When Offered Fall.

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Syllabi: none
  •   Regular Academic Session. 

  • 4 Credits Stdnt Opt

  • 16202 PHIL 3621   LEC 001

  • Instruction Mode: In Person

    Do facts about consciousness and free will conflict with the hypothesis that we are completely physical beings? We will first assess the two most influential arguments for the impossibility of a physical account of the consciousness: the knowledge and conceivability arguments. We will then use these assessments to evaluate a number of possible positions in the ontology of mind. Is the best physicalism eliminativist, reductionist, or anti-reductionist? Is the best anti-physicalism substance dualist, property dualist, idealist, Russellian monist, or panpsychist? Lastly, we will consider the consequences that physicalism has for the claim that we have free will.